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In an MBO contest, managers offer to buy the firm from public shareholders at a premium to 
the current market price and thus have incentives to buy the firm "cheap." Prior studies have 
found evidence that managers, on average, manipulate earnings downward prior to an MBO 
offer in an attempt to convince shareholders that their offer is fair. We extend this finding by 
attempting to explain the substantial cross sectional variation in the degree of manipulation 
across firms reported in these earlier studies. We find that boards with more independent 
directors and higher levels of incentive based compensation for the CEO act to discourage 
such manipulation. AdditionaIIy, our results show that some shareholders, minority and pre-
existing large outside blockholders, appear to be misled by the manipulation. However, new 
blockholders that acquire large shareholdings in the year before the offer are not. We also dis-
cover that managers are more likely to revise their bid upwards when the manipulation is most 
severe and that these new blockholders put pressure on managers to make these revisions. 
Finally, we investigate whether the manipulation has an impact on the final buyout contest out-
come. We find that downward manipulation does not prevent managers from retaining con-
trol of the firm; however, they pay a higher premium. 
INTRODUCTION 
While issues surrounding the quality of earnings have long been of concern to various stake-
holders of the firm, recently significant attention has been garnered by the Security and 
Exchange Commission's (SEC) heightened attention to earnings management (Byrnes and 
Melcher, 1998; Brown, 1999; Barr, 1998). In 1998, then SEC chairman Arthur Levitt 
declared an all out war on earnings management (CPA Journal, 1998; Loomis, 1999). In 
2001, Lynn Turner, Chief Accountant of the SEC, proclaimed an Investor's Bill of Rights 
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stating that "investors have a right to timely and consistent transparent disclosures that 
reflect the true economics of the business, including complete and unbiased financial dis-
closures of all matters management or the auditors would want to know if they were invest-
ing in the company (p.3, 200 I )." The basis of the entire accrual accounting system on which 
earnings numbers are based is that revenues represent amounts earned during the given time 
period and that expenses are incurred during the period and are matched with the revenues 
they help create. Any distortion of the amounts or timing of these numbers can greatly affect 
the firm's stock price. These distortions can also undermine contracts, either explicit or 
implicit, that managers have with various stakeholders in the firm. 
One area where managers have incentives to manipulate earnings is during management 
buyout (MBO) contests. In an MBO contest, managers offer to buy the firm from public 
shareholders at a premium to the current market price. Managers, as insiders, have better 
knowledge of the firm's prospects and its true value than public shareholders. Thus they 
have incentives to buy the firm "cheap" from public shareholders when they have informa-
tion that the true value of the firm is higher than the current market value plus the buyout 
premium. One way managers attempt to convince shareholders that the offer is fair is to 
choose accounting practices that manipulate earnings downward prior to making an MBO 
offer. Because managers have a fiduciary duty to shareholders, an attempt to buy the firm 
cheaply violates this duty. Furthermore, because the size of the premium is substantial in an 
MBO offer (Kaplan, 1989; Smith, 1990), the magnitude of the potential loss to shareholders 
from managerial underpricing is economically substantial. I In fact, minority shareholders 
routinely sue managers over the terms of the buyout offer (DeAngelo, 1985; Peck, 1996; 
Lowenstein, 1985; Perry and Williams, 1994).2 
This study investigates manager's tendencies to manipulate earnings prior to making an 
MBO offer. Investigating earnings management in MBOs is a good event to study because 
the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders is centered around a very discrete 
event in time where there is an obvious conflict. Also, an MBO is different from other 
events that are expected to impact earnings management in at least two ways. First, man-
agers are likely to be aware of a possible MBO well in advance of non-management share-
holders. Anticipation of the MBO is likely to impact managers' reporting strategy during 
the period leading up to the offer, even before investors become aware of the MBO incen-
tives managers face. Second, the MBO is different from most of the reporting incentives we 
I The average premium is 30% above the current market price (Kaplan. 1989: Smith.1990). 
2 However. Perry and Williams (1994) note that the lower earnings themselves can provide a successful defense 
in the event of litigation. 
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normally examine because anticipation of the MBO motivates managers to understate, 
rather than overstate the company's financial position and corporate performance. 
This study attempts to answer two main research questions: (1) what types of firms engage 
in manipulation; and (2) what are the consequences of such manipulation for the ultimate 
outcome of the MBO contest. In particular, investigating pre-existing characteristics of 
firm's that engage in manipulation allows us to identify what corporate governance mecha-
nisms (or lack thereof) minimize managers' incentives to manipulate earnings downward 
and violate their fiduciary duty to shareholders thereby engaging in unethical behavior. 
Finally, by investigating the consequences of manipulation, we document how manipulation 
affects the final terms of the buyout offer and whether market forces, i.e., competitive bid-
ders or minority shareholder litigation, nullify the opportunistic actions of managers after 
the fact. 
This study has two main contributions. First, the results of this study add to the existing lit-
erature on managers' manipulation of earnings during control contests. Prior studies inves-
tigate whether such manipulation occurs (see DeAngelo, 1986, 1988; Perry and Williams, 
1994; Wu, 1997; Christie and Zimmerman, 1994) by measuring the mean level of discre-
tionary accounting choice for a sample of control contests. This paper investigates the role 
corporate governance, market, and litigation mechanisms play in the incentives for such 
manipulation as well as its consequences. Second, the results of this study have public pol-
icy implications, suggesting which corporate governance mechanisms discourage managers 
from manipulating earnings. These issues are currently under consideration by the SEC. 
Recent events surrounding the failures of Enron, World Com, and the accounting scandals 
at these and many other companies have bought into question the reliability of the corporate 
governance structures of U.S. companies. During 2002 Congress, the SEC and the NYSE 
all developed new regulations regarding the operation of corporate governance mechanisms. 
These changes have resulted in a new federal oversight board for the accounting profession, 
mandatory rotation of the external auditor, a requirement that the board of directors must 
contain a majority of independent directors, and new rules governing the function of the 
internal audit committee.] 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 examines the prior literature. 
Section 3 discusses the sample and data. Section 4 presents results on how the severity of 
earnings manipulation varies with both corporate governance mechanisms and market 
responses. Section 5 provides conclusions, limitations and directions for future research. 
3 Many of these regulations are contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
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PRIOR LITERATURE 
Earnings management has been investigated in many contexts including compensation con-
tracts (Healy, 1985), debt contracts (Sweeney, 1994), equity financing (Teoh, Welch, and 
Wong, 1998), union negotiations (Libery and Zimmerman, 1986) and International Trade 
Commission import relief investigations (Jones, 1991). However, the extant literature inveS-
tigating manipulation in control contests is limited. The focus of this stream of research has 
been two-fold: I) whether, on average, manipulation occurs, and 2) alternative methods used 
to detect earnings manipulation. Unfortunately, the cumulative results of these studies have 
been inconsistent. 
Christie and Zimmerman (1994) investigate the depreciation, inventory and investment tux 
credit accounting methods utilized by the management of firms that are takeover targets. 
They find that takeover targets make more income increasing choices than non-takeover tar-
get firms. DeAngelo (1986) examined management manipulation of earnings prior to a 
management buyout. Using an accmal methodology on a sample of 64 NYSE and AMEX 
firms for the period 1973-82, she finds no evidence suppOlting a systematic bias to lower 
earnings in the period preceding the buyout. While several explanations are proposed for 
this result, DeAngelo states the most plausible is that the increased scmtiny of these buyouts 
deterred earnings management behavior. However, Perry and Williams (1994) propose an 
alternative explanation. They highlight several concerns with DeAngelo's sample including 
a high level of troubled firms (which would be subjected to higher scrutiny by auditors), 
high management ownership compared to the general population, and 14 out of the 64 firms 
in her sample were already subject to hostile takeovers. Using a larger sample that controls 
for these factors, Perry and Williams find evidence of earnings management in MBO con-
tests. Wu (1997) also expresses concerns with the DeAngelo sample. He eliminates all 
MBO firms subject to prior hostile takeover bids and uses an industry adjusted change in 
earnings to measure earnings management. Applying the DeAngelo methodology, he does 
not find evidence of earnings management, however, using his own measure of earnings 
management he finds evidence managers manipulate earnings downward prior to making an 
offer to buy the firm. 
While these papers report differences in the average amount of earnings manipulation, all 
report substantial cross sectional variation in the degree of manipulation across firms in their 
samples, but leave this cross-sectional variation unexamined.4 Nor do they explore the 
.j The standard deviation of accrual changes tends to be at least twice that of the mean accrual change in these 
studies. 
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impact manipulation has on the contest characteristics and its ultimate outcome. This study 
will augment the existing literature in three ways. First, this study identifies what combi-
nation of firm ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms (or lack thereof) 
act to create incentives for managers to engage in opportunistic behavior and manipulate 
earnings downward in order to buy the firm cheaply from public shareholders. Secondly, 
this study examines what impact earnings manipulation has on the ultimate outcome of the 
MBO control contest. Thirdly, the study explores whether market forces or minority share-
holder litigation nullify opportunistic managerial behavior after the fact. Finally, our study 
provides a useful benchmark for future research in the area, in light of new regulations that 
are likely to change the reporting environment surrounding an MBO offer and the ability of 
management to under state earnings in order to achieve a lower price. The sample used in 
this study is based in an earlier time period when the new rules did not apply, it will be some 
time before we have sufficient data to examine the full impact of these changes in corporate 
governance structure on earnings management surrounding MBOs. In the mean time, our 
study examines the ability of traditional corporate governance structures to control man-
agers' incentives to manage earnings. This provides a useful benchmark against which the 
new corporate governance structures can be compared when more data becomes available. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
We examine unexpected accruals as a proxy for earnings management. Accounting accru-
als are the difference between net income and cash flows from operations. Following 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1994) we focus on accruals related to depreciation and amor-
tization, the change in operating current assets and the change in operating current liabili-
ties: 
Where: 
TA = total accruals; 
6.CA = change in current assets; 
6.Cash = cha'1ge in cash and cash equivalents; 
6.CL = change in current liabilities; 
6.STD = change in debt included in current liabilities; 
Dep = Depreciation and amortization expense. 
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We use a time-series version of the Moditied Jones Model to estimate the expected accruals 
and measure unexpected accruals as the difference between TA and expected accruals.) If 
managers are anticipating undertaking an MBO then earnings management is likely to occur 
in the period leading up to the offer. We examine the two-year period leading up to the offer 
for evidence of earnings manipulation. The expected accruals model is therefore estimated 
using accounting information three years prior to the MBO offer and earlier. We use the 
two-year period to make our results comparable to other studies (see Perry and Williams, 
1994; DeAngelo, 1986; and Wu, 1997) and because these prior studies indicate that the 
downward manipulation in earnings occurs in the year prior to the MBO offer. The param-
eters of the model are estimated by performing the following regression: 
TAi/Ai,t_1 = u l (1/Ai.t_l ) + u 2 (~REVi,t IAi,t_l) + u J (PPEi,t IAi.t_l ) + Ci,t 
Where: 
Ai.t_1 
~REVi.t 
PPEi,t 
= total assets of firm i at the end of year t-I ; 
= change in revenues for firm i from t-I to t; 
= gross property plant and equipment of firm i a11he end of year 1; 
Up u2' u3 = firm specific parameters; 
ci.t = error term for firm i in year t. 
Unexpected accruals for the two years prior to the MBO offer date are estimated using the 
Modified Jones Model as follows: 
VAi. P = TAi. p/Ai. p-I - a I (I/Ai. p-I) - a2 «~REVi. p - ~RECi.p) fAi. p-I) - a3 (PPEi. lAi. p-I) 
Where: 
5 McNichols (2000) discusses the relative merits of the Jones Model versus the Modified Jones Model and the 
time-series (firm specific) versus the cross-sectional (industry) versions of these models. We estimate a firm spe-
cific. time-series model. Limitations of this model are that it is subject to a survivorship bias because it requires 
at least ten years of accounting data on each firm and it assumes the model parameters are stationary over time. 
The cross-sectional Jones model is not subject to these limitations as model parameters are estimated by indus-
try in the same year as the discretionary accmals are estimated. However. the cross-sectional model is subject 
to other limitations. Firstly. some observations are lost if the firm is in a small industry with insufficient obser-
vations to generate reliable parameter estimates. Secondly. the cross-seclional model requires that parameter 
estimates are stationary across firms in the industry. However. even in the same industry firms are likely to have 
different operating policies regarding many things such as inventory levels and customer credit. This will lead 
to measurement error in the discretionary accmal estimates. For these reasons. we decided to use the time-series 
approach. 
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p 
= unexpected accruals for firm i, in hypothesized manipulation year p; 
= change in accounts receivable of firm i, in year p; 
= estimated firm specific parameters from the expected accruals model; 
= -1, -2, the two hypothesized earnings manipulation years. 
The unexpected accruals are standardized by a(ti,!) an estimate of the standard deviation of 
the residual from the expected accrual model. 
Vi, p = VAi, P / a (Ei,t) 
The significance of the standardized unexpected accruals is computed by calculating a Z-
statistic as follows: 
Zp = LVi. P / [ L( Ti - k) / (Ti - (k + 2))]Y2 
Where: 
T j is the total number of time-series observations used to estimate the expected 
accruals model of firm i; 
k is the number of parameter estimates in the model. K equals 3 for the Modified 
Jones Model. 
Zp is assumed to be asymptotically distributed unit normal. 
Sample and Data 
The time frame of the sample is management buyouts occurring between 1984 and 1987 
which is similar to that used in the previous literature on managers manipulation of earnings 
during control contests (DeAngelo, 1986; Perry and Williams, 1994; Wu, 1997; DeAngelo, 
1986; Christie and Zimmerman, 1994). 
Data Collection 
The Wall Street Journal and the Dow Jones News Wire serve as primary data sources. For 
each firm in the sample we read all articles and news releases for the year prior to the initial 
buyout announcement to two years after or when the firm becomes private and ceased to 
have its activities reported in the financial press. Additionally, we also obtain data for each 
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event in several categories. First, we include actions by minority shareholders since the fair-
ness of the management buyout offer is often litigated by such shareholders (DeAngelo, 
1985; Peck, 1996; Lowenstein, 1985; Perry and Williams, 1994). Next, we include actions 
by independent directors. Often a committee of independent directors is formed to evaluate 
an MBO offer and to consider competing bids, usually with the help of an independent 
investment banker and/or lawyers retained by the committee. We also collect data on block 
acquisitions because professional investors and corporations often acquire a block around 
the time of the MBO offer and subsequently contest the offer (Peck, J 996). 
Additional data is collected on the level of inside ownership concentration the year prior to 
the MBO offer from the firm's proxy statement in the year prior to the MBO offer. We 
adjust these data using The II/sider's Cll1vnicle because proxy statements do not always 
occur one year prior to the offer. Proxy statements are used for obtaining data on the top 
executives' compensation contracts: the percentage of common shares owned by the CEO; 
the percentage of options granted; and total cash compensation. Finally, we use the proxy 
statements to collect data on board composition in the year prior to the MBO offer. CRSP, 
CRSPINASDAQ tapes, and Standard & Poor's Monthly Security Owner's Stock Guide are 
used to collect data on total equity value the month prior to the initial buyout offer using 
share price and shares outstanding data. 
Sample Selection 
A sample of 138 management buyouts is identified from two different sources. We form an 
initial sample of 90 management buyout attempts from 1984 to 1987 by searching the Dow 
Jones News/Retrieval Service for articles containing the following words or phrases: "man-
agement buyout," "leveraged buyout," "LBO," "MBO," "going private," and "taken private." 
For purposes of this study an MBO attempt is defined as an announcement in which top 
management, either alone or with a group of equity investors, makes an offer to buy the firm. 
A sample provided by Steven Kaplan provided forty-eight additional management buyout 
attempts.() 
This sample was reduced for several reasons. First, seventeen firms are eliminated because 
of insufficient return data on either the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) or 
6 We are grateful for Steven Kaplan's generosity in supplying his sample. This sample consists of both success-
ful and unsuccessful management buyouts. The successful buyouts include all buyouts of at least $100 million 
that are announced or completed between 1984 and 1987. He also includes an incomplete sample of buyouts 
that are worth less than $100 million. The failed buyouts include all failed buyouts announced between 1984 
and 1985 of at least $50 million .. 
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CRSPINASDAQ tapes to estimate market model returns. Eight additional firms are elimi-
nated because data on institutional shareholdings are unavailable because they are not 
reported by Standard & Poor's. Five firms are eliminated because The Insider's Chronicle 
did not report data on inside holdings (The Insider's Chronicle began publishing after the 
relevant dates). Twenty-three firms are eliminated because they did not have sufficient data 
on Compustat to estimate standardized abnormal accruals using the Modified Jones Model. 
Finally, consistent with Klein (2002), five firms were eliminated as abnormal accrual out-
liers.7 The final sample consists of 79 firms and includes buyouts initiated by both man-
agement and outside parties. Table 1 reports the parameter estimates from the estimated 
Modified Jones Model. The mean adjusted r-square is 38% which is similar to that found 
in other studies that use the modified Jones model. 
Table 1 
Description statistics for expected accruals model for the modified Jones model for a sample of 79 
buyout attempts 
Variable Average parameter estimate t-statistic 
Standardized intercept 0.271104 
Standardized change in revenues 0.987013 
Standardized gross property, -0.95492 
plant, and equipment 
Average number of years = 13.55696 
Range of years = 7 to 15 
Adjusted R2 = 0.383487 
Sample Characteristics 
-0.19429 
0.110006 
-0.06827 
Table 2 reports the sample characteristics. The first group of variables reported reflects 
earnings management. Following Perry and Williams (1994) we calculate a Z- statistic to 
7 We exclude all firms that with extreme Vips. Extreme is defined as all cases where the absolute Vip is greater 
than four. Five firms are excluded on this basis. Four of these firms engaged in a merger or acquisition during 
the year the discretionary accruals are estimated for and three of these had greater than a 50% increase in total 
assets in that year. Hribar and Collins (2002) report that when accruals are measured as the change in succes-
sive balance sheet accounts, as they are in this paper, then firms that engaged in mergers and acquisitions are 
subject to large measurement error. This error is due to the impact of the acquisition on current asset and cur-
rent liability accounts. 
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test the significance of the standardized abnormal accrual. Consistent with Perry and 
Williams (1994) we find evidence of significant downward manipulation of earnings in the 
year prior to the MBO announcement, but not two years prior. 
Prior research has shown that independent directors monitor managers to ensure that man-
agers act in shareholders interests during control contests (Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner, 
1997). Thus, we also examine board composition. We define independent directors as non-
management directors with no obvious ties to management. Table 2 shows that the typical 
board consists of less than 50% independent directors. Looking at all firms, Cotter, 
Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997) report an average of 69.6% outside directors on the board. 
Thus, it is possible that outside directors in MBO contest firms are not able to exert as much 
influence over management as would be possible in a typical control contest. 
Healy (1985) has shown that managers have incentives to manipulate earnings because of 
compensation contracts, i.e., earnings based bonuses. In particular, as managers cash com-
pensation (salary and bonus) increases there are greater incentives to manipulate earnings 
upwards. To the extent that earnings manipulation is not transparent to market pat:ticipants 
(Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998), managers also have incentives to manage earnings upwards 
to increase the value of their stock holdings. Thus, existing compensation contracts are like-
ly to discourage managers from manipulating earnings downward to acquire the firm more 
cheaply from public shareholders. Table 2 report managers' shareholdings, options, and 
total cash compensation scaled by total assets. The total cash compensation consists of both 
salary and bonus. Ideally, we would like to have data on salary and bonus separately. 
Because most bonus plans are based on accounting earnings, the bonus component of this 
number is likely to be directly impacted by manipulation (Healy 1985). However, firms are 
not required to report bonus and salary separately and most of the firms in our sample do 
not. We scale total cash compensation by total assets since larger firms tend to pay larger 
levels of total compensation. The results show that CEO's typically own between 2% and 
10% of shares outstanding, their new option grant are a very small percentage of the total 
shares outstanding, and have cash compensation that is about 0.5% of total assets. 
We also report variables that reflect the ownership structure of firms in our sample. Inside 
ownership is included because as inside holdings increase, managers have a natural defense 
against a takeover attempt since they control a larger amount of shares outstanding (Stulz, 
1988; Song and Walking, 1993). Thus managers' pre-offer ownership stake is likely to be 
related to their incentive to manipulate earnings downward. Similarly, outside blockhold-
ings are included because outside blockholders can influence the dynamics of the buyout 
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contest. Prior researchers have shown that outside blockholders can facilitate takeovers by 
either aligning with or voting against management in a takeover contest (Walking, 1985; 
Edminster and Walking, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Peck, 1996). Table 2 shows that, 
on average, managers own 15% of shares outstanding, outside blockholders own 6%, and 
institutional investors own 32%. 
Sweeney (1994) has shown that managers have incentives to manipulate earnings to avoid 
default on accounting based covenants in debt contracts. Press and Wintrop (1990) and 
Duke and Hunt (1990) find a positive relation between leverage and the restrictiveness of 
accounting based debt covenants in the 1980's. Thus, we use the level of existing debt to 
proxy for managers' incentives to manipulate earnings upwards to avoid debt covenant 
default. Table 2 reports that in a typical MBO firm long term debt constitutes about 22% of 
pre-buyout total assets. 
Table 2 
Selected sample characteristics for a sample of 79 management buyout attempts 
Variable 
Earnings manipulation: 
Standardized abnormal accrual in Year-l 
z- statistic in Year-I 
(p-value) 
Standardized abnormal accrual in Year-2 
Z- statistic in Year-2 
Corporate governance mechanisms: 
Board compositioll: 
Percentage of independent directors 
CEO compensation: 
Percentage of common stock held 
Options granted as a % of total shares outstanding 
Total cash compensation as a % of total assets 
Ownership structllre: 
Percentage of stock held by insiders 
Percentage of stock held by 5% outside blockholders 
Percentage of stock held by institutional investors 
Mean 
-0.35527 
-2.80508 
(.0025152) 
-0.03594 
-0.28380 
(0.38828) 
42.52039 
9.559274 
0.157814 
0.492307 
14.62426 
6.36517 
31.50347 
Median 
-0.36712 
n.3. 
-0.1102 
n.a. 
45.45455 
2.064307 
o 
0.157938 
5.107803 
o 
30.62368 
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table 2 COllt. 
Variable 
Debt constraints: 
Long term debt as percentage of total assets 
Contest characteristics: 
Percentage of firms that have management initiated buyouts 
Percentage of firms where higher offer is made after 
management's initial offer by an outside bidder 
Percentage of firms where management revised its initial offer 
Percentage of firms where committee of independent directors 
reject management's bid 
Percentage of firms with minority shareholder litigation 
Percentage of firms where a block is acquired in the year 
before the MBO offer 
Percentage of firms where a block is acquired in the year 
after the MBO offer 
Percentage of firms where a blockholder takes actions after 
the MBO offer 
Percentage of firms where managers take actions to deter 
a takeover 
Percentage of firms taken over by an outside third-party 
Percentage buyout premium 
Firm size: 
Total assets 
($ millions) 
n.a. :::: not applicable 
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Mean Median 
22.2729 22.37396 
823 n.a. 
12.7 n.lI. 
27.8 n.a. 
2.5 n.a. 
253 n.a. 
36.7 n.a. 
34.2 n.lI. 
27.8 n.a. 
24.1 n.a. 
8.9 n.a. 
21.5842 20.7765 
534.1506 241.28 
Table 2 also reports the contest characteristics. The results show that 82.3% of management 
buyout contests are initiated by management. On average, 12.7% of the firms in the sample 
receive a higher offer from an outsider and 27.8% of the time management revises its initial 
offer. The committee of independent directors formally rejects managements' offer about 
2.5% of the time. A block is acquired in the year before the offer in 36.7% of the cases and 
during the year after the offer in 34.2% of the cases. Minority shareholders litigate 25.3% 
of the management buyout offers. Given that management's offer is often contested, it is 
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not surprising to find that management takes actions to deter a takeover. Managerial deter-
rence is defined as taking anyone of the following actions: (I) adopting an anti-takeover 
amendment; (2) litigating an outside bidder; (3) increasing management's effective stake by 
buying back shares, debt for equity swap, repurchase of convertible preferred or convertible 
debt for cash, private placement of equity, or repurchase of shares from an investor. We find 
that managers take at least one of these actions 24.1 % of the time. 
Finally, Table 2 reports the final buyout contest outcome; the premium and the identity of 
the successful bidder. Since not all buyout offers are all cash, we estimate the buyout pre-
mium as the cumulative abnormal return around the announcement of the initial buyout 
offer. The final buyout premium is defined as the summation of abnormal returns on trad-
ing days - 20 to when the transaction is completed or 250 days in the case of failed buyouts. 
Day 0 is the day the initial buyout offer is announced in the Wall Street Journal or came over 
the Dow Jones News Wire. Abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between real-
ized returns and market-model expected returns. The CRSP (NASDAQ) value-weighted 
index is used as the market index for CRSP (NASDAQ) firms. The market model is esti-
mated using 200 daily returns up until 120 days prior to the initial buyout announcement. 
Table 2 shows that the premium is on average 21.6% above the stock price one month prior 
to the initial offer. Table 2 also shows that on average 8.9% of all firms are eventually taken 
over by an outside third-party. 
The next section examines how the degree of managerial manipulation of earnings varies 
with corporate governance mechanisms, contest characteristics, and the ultimate buyout out-
come. 
RESULTS 
Perry and Williams (1994) calculate a standardized abnormal accrual from the Jones (1991) 
model and the associated Z-statistic. They then compare the Z-statistic from the MBO sam-
ple to a control sample to determine whether there is evidence of more manipulation in the 
MBO sample. We take the same approach with the Modified Jones Model to test whether 
the degree to which managers manipulate earnings downward varies across sub-samples 
within our MBO sample. We define the sub-samples based on characteristics of corporate 
governance mechanisms (or lack thereof) within the firms and the characteristics of the buy-
out contest. 
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Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
We predict that effective corporate governance mechanisms should effectively dampen man-
agers' incentives to manipulate earnings downward. Table 3 reports the results for the cor-
porate governance variables. We hypothesize that in firms with a relatively weak corporate 
governance structure managers will have greater latitude to manipulate earnings. When con-
templating an MBO, managers of firms with weak corporate governance structures are like-
ly to use more negative discretionary accruals than firms with stronger corporate governance 
structures. To test for differences in the discretionary accruals between tirms with weak and 
firms with strong corporate governance structures we estimate the following statistic: 
Where, V a and V b are the means of the Vi. pS in sub-samples a and b respectively; O'a 2 and 
O'[)2 are the variances of the Vi. pS in sub-samples a and b respectively and Na and Nb are the 
number of observations in sub-samples a and b respectively. 
0'/ = IIN/ :E( T j - k) I (Tj - (k + 2)) for the i firms in sub-sample a; and 
O'b 
2 = IINb 2 :E( T j - k) I (Tj - (k + 2» for the i firms in sub-sample b. 
Board of Directors 
The board of directors has specific oversight over the firm's accounting practices; most 
exchanges recommend an audit committee that consists solely of independent directors. 
The results reported in Table 3 shows statistically significant less manipulation when the 
percentage of independent directors on the board is greater than the sample median value. 
Compensation Contracts 
Managers' compensation contracts can also affect incentives to manipulate earnings. If these 
contracts provide incentives for managers to manipulate earnings upwards, managers will be 
less likely to manipulate earnings downward in an attempt to acquire the firm cheaply from 
public shareholders. To the extent that the market does not perceive upward manipulation 
of earnings, managers with greater stock based compensation are more likely to manipulate 
earnings upwards. Similarly, to the extent that managers have higher levels of total cash 
compensation due to earnings based bonus awards, they will also have disincentives to 
manipulate earnings downward. Table 3 shows statistically significant less manipulation in 
firms where their CEO has greater than the median level of stock holdings and options grant-
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ed. This finding supports the hypothesis that compensation contracts create dis-incentives 
for managers to manipulate earnings downward prior to an MBO offer. There is no signif-
icant difference in discretionary accruals of firms that pay high versus low cash compensa-
tion to their CEOs. 
Ownership Structure 
We also examine ownership structure as an important corporate governance mechanism. In 
addition to CEO stock holdings we also look at the size of all inside holdings, which 
includes shares beneficially held by all mangers. The expected relation between inside hold-
ings and the extent of earnings manipUlation is ambiguous. On the one hand, if managers 
anticipate selling some of their shares in the buyout, as the size of their holdings increase, 
managers have less incentive to manipulate earnings downward as this would decrease the 
market value of their holdings. Alternatively, inside ownership also acts as defense against 
a higher bidder (Stulz, 1988; Song and Walking, 1993). If managers hold sufficient shares 
that they perceive a higher bidder is unlikely to emerge, they will be more likely to manip-
ulate earnings downward to convince public shareholders that a low offer is fair. Yet, it is 
also possible that managers manipulate earnings downward to discourage an outside bidder 
if they believe that the manipulation will not be transparent to these bidders. 
Table 3 
Differences in the statistical significance of standardized abnormal accruals using the 
modified Jones model across various sub-samples defined by corporate governance variables for a 
sample of 79 management buyout attempts 
Variable 
Board composition: 
A verage standardized 
abnormal accrual for 
Year-l 
Firms with percentage -0.2841047 
of independent directors 
above the median 
Firms with percentage -0.4148472 
of independent directors 
at or below the median 
CEO compensation: 
Percentage of common -0.2882158 
stock held greater than 
median value 
Percentage of common -0.4174146 
stock held less than or 
equal to median value 
z- statistic for 
Difference between 
Two Sub-samples 
For Year-l 
2.02053 
2.01297 
P-value (one-tail) 
0.021664 
0.022059 
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table 3 COllf. 
Variable Average Z- sta tistie for P-value (one-tail) 
standardized Difference between 
abnormal accrual for Two Sub-samples 
Year-l For Year-l 
CEO Composition 
Options granted as a % of -0.2789395 
total shares greater than 
the median value 
Options granted as a % of -0.4225105 2.22764 0.012952 
total shares less than or 
egualto the median value 
Total cash compensation! -0.3634236 
total assets greater than 
the median value 
Total cash compensation! -0.3473170 -0.25084 0.40097 
total assets less than or 
egual to the median value 
Ownership structure: 
Percentage of stock held -0.4756151 
by insiders greater than 
the median value 
Percentage of stock held -0.2379303 -3.70290 .00010658 
by insiders less than or 
egual to the median value 
Percentage of stock held -0.4512529 
by 5% outside 
blockholders greater than 
the median value 
Percentage of stock held .00010658 -2.36255 .0090749 
by 5% outside 
blockholders less than or 
egualto the median value 
Percentage of stock held -0.4053803 
by institutional investors 
greater than the median 
value 
Percentage of stock held -0.3064093 -1.54225 0.061506 
by institutional investors 
less than or equal to the 
median value 
Debt constraints: 
Long term debt! total -0.4602293 
assets greater than the 
median value 
Long term debt! total -0.2476162 -3.31402 .00045983 
assets less than or equal to 
the median value 
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Table 3 shows that downward manipulation of earnings is greater in firms that with greater 
than the medial level of inside holdings. This suggests that managers with higher inside 
ownership may manipulate earnings downward to justify a lower offer to shareholders with-
out fear that downward manipulation will attract a competitive bid. 
Prior researchers have shown that outside blockholders monitor managers (Walking, 1985; 
Edminster and Walking, 1985; and Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Thus, we also include meas-
ures of outside shareholdings in the year prior to the MBO. Table 3 reports that the down-
ward manipulation is more severe in firms with greater than the median value of percentage 
of 5% outside blockholders and percentage of institutional holdings. This finding suggests 
that managers may manipulate earnings downward to justify a lower offer to blockholders 
and institutional investors. 
Finally, we look at the level of debt and the constraints it places on manipulation. As the 
level of debt increases, managers have less incentive to manipulate earnings downward and 
violate accounting based covenants (Sweeney, 1995). However, Table 3 shows that the 
downward manipulatiun is not greater for firms with less than the median value of debt. 
In summary, the results reported in Table 3 suggests that some corporate governance mech-
anisms act to discourage managers from manipulating earnings prior to making an offer. 
The severity of the observed downward earnings manipulation is less when the firm has a 
board with more independent directors and higher levels of stock-based incentive compen-
sation. The next section examines how the market for corporate control and events during 
the buyout contest are related to the severity of the manipulation. 
Market Mechanisms 
In this section we investigate whether managements' attempt to manipulate earnings down-
ward to acquire the firm cheaply is transparent to other participants in the buyout contest. 
We examine the actions of outside third-party bidders, the committee of independent direc-
tors, and minority shareholders. We also examine whether managers act in ways that are 
consistent with manipUlating earnings downward to acquire the firm cheaply. The response 
of market participants are all measured after management makes their initial offer. 
Table 4 reports the average standardized abnormal accrual and the Z-statistic for year -1 for 
buyout offers that were initiated by management and those that were not. Outside initiated 
buyouts have more severe manipulation. This is surprising since Perry and Williams (1994) 
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argue that MBO offers that follow an outside or takeover offer are likely to have less manip-
ulation because management will not have time to manipulate earnings in response to the 
takeover. Our results suggest that managers manipulate earnings downward prior to an 
MBO offer initiated by outsiders, but that the degree of downward manipulation may pro-
vide a signal to an outside bidder that management is preparing to buyout the company 
cheap and causes a pre-emptive bid by an outside third-party. 
Prior researchers have shown that a lower offer is more likely to be subject to scrutiny by 
competitive bidders (Peck, 1996, Hirshleifer and Png, 1990). Thus, we also look at the rela-
tion between manipulation and additional bidding that occurs after the initial MBO offer. If 
downward manipulation is used to make a low offer and the manipulation is transparent to 
outside bidders, then we would expect to see more manipulation in firms that attract a high-
er offer by an outside bidder following management's initial offer. Alternatively, if down-
ward manipulation is not transparent, then potential bidders may conclude that the down-
ward change in earnings does not warrant a higher offer. Table 4 shows that a higher bid by 
an outside party occurs when there has been less manipulation. Even so, we do find evi-
dence that management is more likely to revise their bid if there has been more manipula-
tion. This finding suggests that outside parties do not always use the extent of downward 
manipulation to determine whether a higher offer is warranted. In contrast, managers appear 
to have better information about the degree of downward manipulation reflected in a greater 
likelihood of revising their offer when the downward manipulation has been more severe. 
We also examine how shareholders respond to the degree of earnings manipulation. We look 
at both large blockholders and minority shareholders. If minority shareholders can detect 
opportunistic manipulation, minority shareholder litigation of the buyout offer is likely to be 
related to the size of the downward manipulation. Alternatively, if shareholders cannot 
detect the manipulation, then downward manipulation and the subsequent decline in earn-
ings is likely to justify a lower offer. The results in Table 4 support the latter explanation. 
We find more manipulation is associated with less litigation by minority shareholders. 
Prior researchers have shown that 5% outside blockholders acquire blocks during the year 
before and after the MBO offer and that these block holders are either corporations acquir-
ing a toe-hold prior to making a bid or control specialists that contest the fairness of the offer 
(Peck, 1996). Table 4 shows that new block acquisitions after the offer and blockholder 
actions (such as litigating the fairness of the offer) are not associated with the level of 
manipulation. While not reported in the table, we also examine the relation between manip-
ulation and block acquisitions prior to the MBO announcement. We find that the average 
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standardized abnormal accrual is -.6236 when a block is acquired in the year before the 
MBO compared to -.1996 when there is no block acquisition. The Z statistic for this dif-
ference is -6.098 with a p-value of .0000. This suggests that these blockholders respond to 
the manipulation by acquiring a block. Peck (1996) shows that blockholders are less likely 
to acquire a block after the offer when a block acquisition has been made before the offer. 
Thus, if firms with the most severe manipulation have already attracted a blockholder prior 
to the offer, the firms remaining that are attractive to a blockholder after the offer are likely 
to be firms with less severe manipulation. We also find evidence that blockholders put pres-
sure on management to revise their bid upwards. We find that the spearman correlations 
between whether managers revise their bid upwards and whether a blockholder has acquired 
a block in the year before the MBO offer is positive (.21290) and statistically significant (p= 
.0596). In contrast, we find that whether management revises its bid upwards is not signif-
icantly correlated with any of the other variables we investigate. 
Finally, we investigate the relation between actions managers take to deter a takeover and 
degree of downward manipulation. If managers use downward manipulation to acquire the 
firm more cheaply, we would expect that such managers will also be more likely to take anti-
takeover actions. However, we do not find statistically significant results to support this 
assertion. 
Table 4 
Differences in the statistical significance of standardized abnormal accruals using the modified 
Jones model across various sub-samples defined by the buyout contest characteristics for a sample 
of 79 management buyout attempts 
Variable 
Firms that have management 
initiated buyouts 
Firms that ha ve outside party 
initiated buyouts 
Firms where higher offer is 
made after management's 
initial offer by an outside 
bidder 
A verage standardized 
abnormal accrual for 
Year-l 
-0.3168914 
-0.5334471 
-0.0566870 
Firms where there is no -0.39854 JO 
higher offer is made after 
management's initial offer by 
an outside bidder 
z- statistic 
For Year-! 
1.99345 
2.37041 
P-value (one-tail) 
0.023106 
.0088842 
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table 4 cOllf. 
Variable A verage standardized Z- statistic P-vulue (one-tail) 
abnormal accrual for For Year-l 
Year-l 
Firms where management -05902500 
revised its initial offer 
Firms where management -0.2645737 -4.06396 .000024124 
does not revised its initial 
offer 
Firms with minority -0.2504880 
shareholder litigation 
Firms without minority -0.3907871 1.65026 0.049445 
shareholder litigation 
Firms where a block is -0.3286452 
acquired in the year after the 
MBO offer 
Firms where no block is -0.3690919 0.56139 0.28727 
acquired in the year after the 
MBO offer 
Firms where a block holder -0.3405409 
takes actions during the year 
after the MBO offer 
Firms where a block holder -0.3609526 0.24987 0.40135 
does not take actions tthe 
year after the MBO offer 
Firms where managers take -0.3695322 
actions to deter a takeover 
Firms where managers do not -0.3102247 0.67594 0.24954 
take actions to deter a 
takeover 
In summary, we find that prior to managers making a buyout offer, it is more likely an out-
side block will be acquired and that an outside bidder will initiate a buyout offer when earn-
ings manipUlation has been more severe. However, once management has placed their buy-
out offer, we find no evidence that outside bidders, independent directors or minority share-
holders respond to the downward manipulation. However, we find mixed evidence related 
to the opportunistic nature of the downward manipulation. Managers are more likely to 
revise their initial bid when manipulation is more severe and new pre-offer blockholders 
appear to be the contest participants that act to put pressure on management to do so. 
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Buyout Olltcome 
Both our findings and Perry and Williams (1994) show that managers manipulate earnings 
downward in the year prior to making a buyout offer to public shareholders. However, the 
findings discussed in the prior section show that various market participants act in different 
ways to the downward manipulation. Thus, we also investigate whether the manipulation 
has an impact on the final buyout contest outcome; both the price paid and the identity of 
the winning bidder. 
Table 5 shows that firms taken over by a outsider third party have much less downward 
manipulation than those which are not. However, Table 5 shows that a buyout premium 
larger than the median value occurs when the downward manipulation is more severe. These 
findings show that while management seem to use to maintain control of their firm they are 
willing to pay shareholders a larger premium to acquire this control cheaply from share-
holders. Therefore, we cannot say whether shareholders are made better or worse off as a 
result of this manipulation. 
Table 5 
Differences in the statistical significance of standardized abnormal accruals using the 
modified Jones model across various sub-samples defined by the ultimate buyout outcome for a 
sample of 79 management buyout attempts 
Variable 
Firms taken over by an 
outside third-party 
Firms not taken over by an 
outside third-party 
A verage standardized 
abnormal accrual for 
Year -I 
0.1579571 
-0.4051653 
Buyout premium is above the -0.4948280 
median value 
Buyout premium is less than -0.2121303 
or equal to the median value 
z- sta tisti c 
For Year-I 
2.80912 
-4.40712 
P-value (one-tail) 
.0024839 
.0000052378 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Recently the SEC has escalated their attack on earnings management. It is unethical for 
managers to use such practices to enrich themselves at the expense of their shareholders. 
When managers offer to buy the firm from their public shareholders they have a fiduciary 
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duty to offer a fair price. However, consistent with previous findings we find that managers 
manipulate earnings downward apparently to justify a lower offer to shareholders. We 
investigate whether corporate governance mechanisms discourage such behavior before the 
offer and whether participants in the buyout contest nullify this behavior after the initial 
offer has been made. 
We find evidence that some corporate governance mechanisms act to discourage such 
manipulation. The severity of the observed downward earnings manipulation is less when 
the firm has a board with more independent directors and higher levels of stock-based incen-
tive compensation. We find mixed evidence on the role that market participants play in nul-
lifying the impact of downward manipulation on an initial low offer. Outside bidders are 
more likely to initiate the buyout but are less likely to make an offer higher than manage-
ments' when manipulation is most severe. We find that minority shareholders and pre-exist-
ing outside block holders appear to be misled by the manipulation. But blockholders that 
acquire a block in the year before the MBO offer are not. Yet, we also find that managers 
are more likely to revise their bid upwards when the manipulation is most severe and the 
new pre-offer blockholders appear to be the ones that pressure management into these revi-
sions. 
Both corporate governance and market mechanisms do not appear to be adequate in elimi-
nating the impact of manipulation on the final outcome. We find that in the presence of 
manipulation managers are more likely to successfully acquire the firm. However, this is 
partially mitigated in the final buyout premium paid. The premium is likely to be higher for 
firms with the most severe manipulation. Additionally, our findings suggest that corporate 
governance mechanisms are more effective than market mechanisms for discouraging 
manipulation. Both increasing the number of independent directors on the board and pro-
viding more incentive compensation for the CEO are important steps that managers can take 
to discourage downward manipulation. 
We should note some limitations of the current research and how they provide opportunities 
for additional future research in the area. The sample period used is older and may be less 
relevant to current conditions. However, the time period of the sample is used to be com-
parable and augmented with the vast body of previous literature in this area (e.g., Perry and 
Williams, t 994; Wu, t 997; Peck, t 996; Kaplan, 1989, Kaplan and Stein, 1990). Of course, 
conditions change over time. Recent events surrounding the faiJures of Enron, World Com, 
and the accounting scandals at these and many other companies have bought into question 
the reliability of the corporate governance structures of U.S. companies. During 2002 
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Congress, the SEC and the NYSE all developed new regulations regarding the operation of 
corporate governance mechanisms. These changes have resulted in a new federal oversight 
board for the accounting profession, mandatory rotation of the external auditor, a require-
ment that the board of directors must contain a majority of independent directors, and new 
rules governing the function of the internal audit committee.8 Also since the early 1990's 
the SEC has taken a harder line, than in the past, when companies are found to be overstat-
ing earnings. These new regulations are likely to change the reporting environment sur-
rounding an MBO offer and ability of management to understate earnings in order to achieve 
a lower price. While the sample used in this study is based in an earlier time period when 
the new rules did not apply, it will be some time before we have sufficient data to examine 
the full impact of these changes in corporate governance structure on earnings management 
surrounding MBOs. In the mean time, our study examines the ability of traditional corpo-
rate governance structures to control managers' incentives to manage earnings. This pro-
vides a useful benchmark against which the new corporate governance structures can be 
compared when more data becomes available. 
Additionally, this paper does not perform multivariate analysis. The extent of earnings 
manipulation could be affected by the interaction of numerous mechanisms and incentives. 
This type of analysis would use different models and would provide different results than 
the simple measure of manipulation. Some market participants may use more naive models 
to measure changes in accrual than others. These more naive models may in fact capture 
misclassified manipulation but may provide more powerful tests of how market participants 
react to perceived opportunistic earnings management. Thus, this measure may depend on 
both the model of accruals that they use (for example, DeAngelo, Jones, modified-Jones, 
time series versus cross-sectional Jones) as well as whether they adjust their perception of 
opportunistic manipulation depending on the corporate governance mechanisms in place. 
We believe that the above issues provide fertile ground for future research. 
8 Many of these regulations are contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
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